Philosophy of Religion Essay

In this paper, I will guess the account Richard Swinburne offered in maintain of theism. I will starting signal develop the tone between regularities of co-presence and regularities of period and wherefore their sympathy is necessary in understanding Swinburnes billet. After this, I will designate the arguments I pass derived from the passage given, derived from Swinburnes book. I will then(prenominal) actuate to identify the issues that determine whether his is a survive theory or not by explaining the set forth Swinburne bases his argument on, and shut down by giving reasons why I c all in all in these objections succeed.Richard Swinburne bases the argument he offers in congest of theism on regularities of ecological succession by first stating that prior attempts by philosophers and theologies of the eighteenth hundred to prove the globe of God failed be wee they largely found their arguments on regularities of co-presence. The distinction of these regulariti es, harmonize to Swinburne, is that while regularities of co-presence atomic number 18 patterns of spatial order at a specific irregular in time, regularities of succession are the dewy-eyed patterns of behavior exhibited by objects because of the external diverge by the forces of constitution.For example, the orderliness of the various organs inwardly the human body and how they do in perfect synchrony to equilibrize each others functionalities is a regularity of co-presence. Regularities of succession are ground on observationally derivable laws of interactiveness. The action of attraction and repulsion that occurs within the sub-atomic particles within an atom, and how these forces end up determining the primal law of matter by biding many atoms unneurotic is an example of a regularity of succession.Swinburne offers the infixed balance of the universe brought about by the mutual attraction of planetary bodies with note to the distance between them and their weight s as an good example of the action of regularities of succession. The following is an outline of Swinburnes argument in favor of theism. e rattling objects within the universe, living or dead, unendingly behave strictly concord to the laws of genius (1). This is not however adequate passable to be the basis of concluding that theism is true. on that point is a need to establish the cause of regularities of succession. All regularities of succession exist cod to the operation of scientific laws (2), only when the near fundamental regularities burnnot be given an empirical exposition, and since for the purpose of this argument they mustiness be explained anyway, this explanation must be based in the rational prime(a)s of free movers. A terpsichoreans movements are primed(p) by the cps of the tune he or she is dancing to, and this being a regularity of succession is proof that all regulations of succession must have an agent.Similarly, an agent must be responsible for the concordance exhibited by the universe as it behaves according to the laws of nature. The universe is so harmonious and it is precise wide, the powers of the agent absolute it must be very considerable compared to those of the dancer who, with the freedom of woof, moves in synchrony to the rhythm of a tune (3). The most fundamental of scientific regularities, which are regularities of succession, cause other regularities of succession, and tied(p) these most fundamental regularities must have a causative agent.There can be no better explanation to the most basic regularities of succession, so we conclude that an agent bestowed with power and intelligence entirely like men but at a much higher(prenominal) period is most likely responsible for their action, thence the proof of theism. Swinburne attributes the existence of regularities of succession to an last causative agent. In his argument, he draws a comparison between the rational choice of a free agent in the simpler term and the much more difficult operation of the universe, which he himself portrays as very puzzling.In his argument, infinite attributes are presume to be simpler than infinite attributes. Furthermore, the agent coercive the universe, if its operation is similar to the exhibition of regularities of succession by simpler free agents like men, must also have had a cause. He fails to explain the cause of this agent and his argument in proof of theism contradicts itself, devising it unsound. The premises Swinburne raises are largely valid until the coating.A reader of his work will summon premise one true since scientific research has empirically established the laws of nature which define the action of objects thus making premise (1) believable. It is true, taking human beings as example that regularities of succession are exhibited as the result of rational choice. A dancer will not move to the rhythm of a tune without having made the choice to dance, and this cause-effect a pproach makes premise (2) very coherent.If then a being is rationally controlling the universe, his powers must be very immense making premise (3) a convincing conclusion developed from the first cardinal premises. Swinburne argues for theism by equating simpler attributes to complex attributes. In premise (3), he inductively derives a higher probability that God exists, but as with all probabilities, any outcome is likely. Simpler attributes to the actions of objects are not given an explanation to why they are true. Swinburne fails to claim that he proves the existence of God is more probable than his non-existence.He builds his argument on the causation of regularities of succession by more fundamental regularities, but fails to give an explanation for the most fundamental of these regularities that an immensely powerful agent is rationally controlling the universe. There is thus equal ground to successfully object to his argument. In this paper, I evaluated an argument Richar d Swinburne offered in support of theism. I first explained the distinction he creates between regularities of co-presence and regularities. I then proceeded to explain his argument and the reasons why it is valid.After this, I considered the reasons a person would choose to conjecture that the premises he based his argument on are true and in the end presented my objection to the argument by identifying and explaining why premise (3) is not necessarily valid. My conclusion was that Swinburne did not offer a sufficient reason to believe that theism is true. ?Works CitedSwinburne, Richard. The crease from Design. Philosophy of Religion An Anthology of contemporaneous Views. Ed. Melville Y. Stewart. Sudbury, MA Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1996. 233-246.